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Abstract 
We investigated if young children are more likely to spontaneously attribute mental states to 
members of their own social group. We asked 5- and 6-year-old children to describe the 
actions of interacting geometric shapes and manipulated whether children believed these 
shapes represented their own group or another group. Both 5- and 6-year-old children 
spontaneously used mental state words more often when describing members of their own 
group.  Furthermore, 6-year-olds produced a greater diversity of mental state terms when 
talking about their own social group. These effects held across two different social categories 
(based on gender and geographical location). This research has important implications for our 
understanding of a broad range of social phenomena including dehumanization, intergroup 
bias and theory of mind.   
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Young children are more likely to spontaneously attribute mental states to members of 
their own group  
The ability to understand RWKHUV¶PLQGVLVYLWDOWRKXPDQVRFLDO interaction (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007). From infancy, we are able to 
reason about the intentions (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998), desires (Repacholi & 
Gopnik, 1997), and perhaps even the beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) of other people.  
However, social psychological research has demonstrated that we do not always take 
the mental life of others into account (Harris & Fiske, 2006). We VRPHWLPHVµdehumanize¶, or 
deny mental capacities such as intelligence, agency and emotional depth to members of social 
outgroups (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000). Outgroup dehumanization has been an 
integral part of prejudice and discrimination throughout history and remains an important 
political issue today (Haslam, 2006). Although the tendency to dehumanize others is not 
limited to any one political group, rising support for far right parties throughout the West 
makes the significance of this topic all too clear (Roth, 2017).  
Here we combine developmental work on theory of mind with social psychological 
research on dehumanization by investigating if young children are more likely to 
spontaneously consider the mental states of ingroup members than those of outgroup 
members. In order to do this, we adapted a paradigm created by Abell, Happé, and Frith 
(2000) in which participants are asked to describe the behaviour of interacting geometric 
shapes. The actions of these shapes have been shown to elicit mental state terms in typically 
developing children and adults (Abell et al., 2000). We manipulated whether children 
believed these shapes represented members of their own social group or a different social 
group. We predicted that children would use mental state terms more often, and with greater 
variety, when describing interactions of their own group. 
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We tested these hypotheses with two different types of social group - focusing on 
divisions related to gender and geography. We chose to manipulate gender because previous 
research has shown that this is a particularly salient category to young children and that 
knowledge of gender stereotypes influences their aspirations and career goals (Bian, Leslie, 
& Cimpian, 2017). We also decided to manipulate geographical or national origin because 
this social division is so deeply intertwined with current political debates regarding 
immigration. We reasoned that, if the tendency to attribute more mental states to members of 
the ingroup is robust, then the effect should hold across both of these types of group.  
We opted to work with 5- and 6-year-olds because, by this age, children are proficient 
at mental state reasoning (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), frequently incorporate mental state 
terms into their conversation (Frith & Frith, 2003) and show preferences for members of their 
own gender and geographically based group (McLoughlin, Tipper, & Over, 2017).  
Method 
Participants 
 The sample consisted of 64 5-year-old (mean age: 5 years 6 months; age range: 4 
years 11 months-5 years 11 months) and 64 6-year-old children (mean age: 6 years 5 months; 
age range: 6 years 0 months-6 years 11 months) with an equal number of boys and girls in 
each age group. Children were recruited from local primary schools situated in a small town 
in Northern England and from a science museum located in an urban centre. Further 
demographic information was not collected.  
Six additional children were tested but excluded from analyses due to developmental 
delay (n = 1), technical error (n = 3), shyness (i.e., the child did not respond to any of the test 
questions or prompts, see below; n = 1) and for misunderstanding the instructions (n = 1). 
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The sample size was based on previous research exploring the development of intergroup 
cognition (e.g., Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Martin, Bennett, & Murray, 2008; 
McLoughlin et al., 2017). We decided on the sample size for each comparison in advance and 
data collection was stopped once the pre-specified sample size was reached.  
Stimuli and Materials 
Animations. The videos were originally developed by Abell and colleagues (Abell et 
al., 2000) and later used by other labs (e.g., Salter, Seigal, Claxton, Lawrence, & Skuse, 
2008) to examine mental state attribution. The key feature of these videos from our 
perspective is that they can either be described in terms of simple actions (e.g., poking each 
other) or in terms of perceived mental states (e.g., teasing each other).  
The videos depict a big and a smaller animated triangle that appear to interact. In the 
video used for the warm-up trial, one shape follows the other shape around the screen in a 
way that could be described as trying to imitate or mock that character. The main purpose of 
this warm-up trial was to familiarise the children with the stimuli. In the two videos used in 
the test phase, one shape appears to coax the other shape outside and, in the other video, one 
shape appears to deliberately surprise the other shape. A fourth video created by Abell et al. 
(2000) was discarded as the content was not ideally suited for young children (i.e., one shape 
attempts to seduce the other shape).  
Each video is approximately 40 seconds in length. To avoid any assumptions based on 
gender or national stereotypical colour associations, the original colours of the animated 
shapes (red and blue) were changed to black using Movavi Video Editor software. The videos 
were presented to participants on a Lenovo ThinkPad Intel Core i5 laptop.  
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Scale. A 4-point Likert scale was used to PHDVXUHFKLOGUHQ¶VH[SOLFLWSreference for 
the social groups (McLoughlin et al., 2017). This scale took the form of a bar chart with a 
³1RWDWDOO´RSWLRQIROORZHGE\EODFNEDUVWKDWLQFUHDVHGLQKHLJKWWRUHSUHVHQW³$OLWWOH´³$
PHGLXPDPRXQW´DQG³$ORW´ 
Design and Counterbalancing 
The study had a 2 (type of group: gender, geographical location) × 2 (group 
membership: ingroup, outgroup) × 2 (age: 5-year-old, 6-year-old) mixed design. &KLOGUHQ¶V
age and the type of group were treated as between subjects variables and group membership 
was treated as a within subjects variable. The dependent variables were the total number and 
the diversity of mental state terms that children used in their description of the videos. 
The video associated with the two groups was counterbalanced where half of 
FKLOGUHQVDZ WKH µFRD[LQJ¶ video paired with their own group and half of children saw the 
µcoaxing¶ video paired with their outgroup. The order in which the two videos µFRD[LQJ¶DQG
µVXUSULVLQJ¶) were presented was also counterbalanced, as was the order in which children 
were presented with the two groups.   
Procedure 
Warm-up trial. Following a brief warm-up phase where the experimenter 
encouraged children to engage in a conversation with her, she introduced the warm-up video. 
This warm-up video was used to acclimatise children to the procedure. The experimenter 
introduced the video without making any references to gender or geographical location. She 
VKRZHGFKLOGUHQDVOLGHZLWKWZRWULDQJOHVDQGVDLG³7KHILUVWYLGHRWells the story of two 
children, look here is one child (pointed to the big triangle) and here is another child (pointed 
to the smaller WULDQJOH´6KH informed children that after the video, they could tell her what 
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they thought was happening. The experimenter then played the relevant video twice. 
Following this, a screenshot image of the two triangles from the video appeared on the screen 
and the experimenter proceeded to ask children four questions to elicit descriptions of what 
had happened. The experimeQWHUILUVWDVNHG³:KDWGR\RXWKLQNZDVKDSSHQLQJLQWKH
YLGHR"´DQGRQFHWKHFKLOGKDGUHVSRQGHG, ³:KDWGR\RXWKLQNWKHFKLOGUHQZHUHGRLQJ"´ 
7KHVHTXHVWLRQVZHUHIROORZHGE\WZRIXUWKHUSUREHVZKHUHWKHH[SHULPHQWHUDVNHG³7HOOPH
DERXWWKLVFKLOG´and pointed first to the bigger character, then to the smaller character. If the 
child did not respond to a test question, the experimenter prompted them again. If the child 
did not respond to the prompt, then the experimenter moved onto the next question. If the 
FKLOGUHVSRQGHGWRWKHWHVWTXHVWLRQVZLWKDUHVSRQVHOLNH³,GRQ¶WNQRZ´RU³,DOUHDG\WROG
\RX´WKHH[SHUimenter moved onto the next question without using the prompt.  Children 
were not given any specific feedback on their performance; the experimenter responded 
³$OULJKW´RU³2Nay´to their statements regardless of what they said.  
Gender groups. In the gender group condition, the experimenter introduced the test 
YLGHRVE\VD\LQJ³1RZ,DPJRing to show you two more videos- one of them is going to be 
DERXWWZRER\VDQGWKHRWKHURQHLVJRLQJWREHDERXWWZRJLUOV´7KHSURFHGXUHIRUWKHWHVW
trials was identical to that of the warm-up trial with the exception that the experimenter 
specified the gender of the characters for the test questions (e.J³:KDWGR\RXWKLQNWKHER\V 
ZHUHGRLQJ"´³7HOOPHDERXWWKLVJLUO´).  
Geographically based groups. In this condition, the experimenter introduced the 
ingroup test video by saying that LWFRQFHUQHG³WZRFKLOGUHQZKROLYHLQWKHsame town as 
you. They go to a school just like your school and they talk just like you do´&KLOGUHQZHUH
told that the RXWJURXSYLGHRLQFRPSDULVRQLQYROYHG³WZRFKLOGUHQZKROLYHLQDFRXQWU\D
long way away from here. They go to a school quite different from your school and they talk 
LQDGLIIHUHQWODQJXDJHWR\RX´The test questions were identical to that of the warm-up trial 
SPONTANEOUS MENTAL STATE ATTRIBUTION TO GROUP MEMBERS 8 
 
but that the geographical origin of the characters was specified HJ³:KDWGR\RXWKLQNWKH
FKLOGUHQIURP\RXUWRZQZHUHGRLQJ"´³7HOOPHDERXWWKLVFKLOGIURPWKHFRXQWU\IDUDZD\´ 
Explicit preference. Once the videos were over, the experimenter introduced children 
to the 4-point measurement scale and asked them to point to how much they liked people 
belonging to their own and the other social group. This was done to check that children 
preferred their own group (Dunham et al., 2011). At the end of the session, children were 
thanked for their participation and debriefed in a way as to ensure that they left the 
experiment in a positive frame of mind. 
Coding 
Coding scheme. We developed a coding scheme based on previous research 
investigating the mental state content of adult and FKLOGUHQ¶V speech (Abell et al., 2000; 
Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & de Rosnay, 2013; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000). 
Words were counted DVUHIHUULQJWRPHQWDOVWDWHVLIWKH\UHIHUHQFHGDFKDUDFWHU¶VWKRXJKWVDQG
desires (e.g., to want, to try, to like, to know, to decide, to look for), emotions (e.g., to be 
angry, scared, upset), intentions (e.g., to be naughty, cheeky) or current states (e.g., to be 
funny, shy). References to mental states involving interactions between the two characters 
were also coded in this category (e.g., pretending, tricking, arguing, surprising, spying). We 
coded the total number of mental state words children produced to describe each group and 
the diversity of mental state terms they used in each description. For example, a child who 
said a character ZDV³WU\LQJWR´GRVRPHWKLQJWZLFHproduced two mental state terms in total 
but only one unique mental state term. Alternatively, when a child used two mental state 
words in conjunction with each other, for example, saying DFKDUDFWHU³ZDQWHGWRVFDUH´
someone, they were coded as producing two mental state and two unique mental state terms. 
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Occasionally, in the gender group condition, children used an incorrect gender 
pronoun when referring to one of the characters, for example, referring to a character the 
H[SHULPHQWHUKDGLQWURGXFHGDVIHPDOHDVµKH¶0HQWDOVWDWHZRUGVproduced in combination 
with the incorrect pronoun were excluded from the analyses (n =  2).  
Reliability. &KLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHVfor both test videos were transcribed and coded by 
the first author. A second rater, unaware of condition, recoded 100% of the data from the 
transcripts. Reliability between the two coders was very high for the number of mental state 
terms in the ingroup (ICC = .99, 95% CI [.99, .99]) and outgroup condition (ICC = .99, 95% 
CI [.99, .99]). Reliability was also very high for the diversity of mental state terms produced 
in both conditions (ICC = .99, 95% CI [.98, .99] and ICC = .98, 95% CI [.98, .99] 
respectively). The few disagreements between the coders were resolved by discussion. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
In our preliminary analyses, we inspected the data to see if there were any main 
effects of participant gender on the dependent variables. There were not (all p¶V!) and, 
as a result, we collapsed across this variable and do not consider it further.    
Number of Mental State Words Produced 
We conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA with group membership associated with 
the video (ingroup, outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) and 
type of group (gender, geographical location) as between-subject factors.  In line with our 
predictions, this result revealed a main effect of group membership: children used 
significantly more mental state words in the ingroup condition (M = 2.44, SD = 2.55) than in 
the outgroup condition, (M = 1.77, SD = 1.92), F (1, 124) = 8.50, p  SDUWLDOȘ 6, 
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95% CI [.22, 1.13] (see Figure 1, panel A). There was also a main effect of age where 6-year-
olds produced more mental state terms (M = 2.49, SD = 2.37) than 5-year-olds (M = 1.71, SD 
= 2.12), F (1, 124) = 5.96, p  SDUWLDOȘ2 = .05, 95% CI [.15, 1.42], presumably because 
older children are generally more proficient in the use of mental state terms (Hughes & Dunn, 
1998). There was no main effect of type of group (F (1, 124) = 1.49, p = .225), no interaction 
between group membership and age (F (1, 124) = .46, p > .250) and no interaction between 
type of group and group membership or age (all F¶VDOOp¶V!There was also no 
three-way interaction between these variables (F (1, 124) = .02, p > .250). Thus, children 
produced a greater number of mental state terms when describing their ingroup than their 
outgroup and this effect held across both types of social group ± gender and geographically 
based groups. 
Having run these analyses, we wanted to check that this effect was not driven by a 
tendency for children to talk more about the ingroup overall. We therefore ran a further 
analysis testing how many words children spoke in total in each condition. Children did not 
produce significantly more words in the ingroup condition (M = 61) than the outgroup 
condition (M = 57; t (127) = 1.64, p = .104). Although this analysis did not reach statistical 
significance, we adopted a conservative approach and reran our original analyses using the 
SURSRUWLRQRIFKLOGUHQ¶VVSHHFKWKDWUHIHUHQFHGPHQWDOVWDtes as the dependent variable. This 
analysis showed that children used proportionally more mental state words when talking 
about ingroup videos (M = .05, SD = .07) than when talking about outgroup videos (M = .03, 
SD = .03), F (1, 124) = 7.60, p  SDUWLDOȘ , 95% CI [.00, .02]. There was no main 
effect of age (F (1, 124) = 2.72, p = .102) or type of group (F (1, 124) = .01, p > .250) and no 
interaction between type of group and the other critical variables (all F¶VDOOp¶V! 
.250) on the proportion of mental state words children produced. The group membership × 
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age interaction also did not reach conventional levels of significance (F (1, 124) = 3.61, p = 
.060). 
Diversity of Mental State Words Produced 
We carried out a mixed ANOVA with the group membership of the video (ingroup, 
outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) and type of group 
(gender, geographical location) as between-subject factors which yielded a main effect of 
group membership, F (1, 124) = 4.41, p  SDUWLDOȘ , 95% CI [.01, .47]. Again, 
consistent with our predictions, children produced a greater diversity of mental state terms in 
the ingroup condition (M = 1.35, SD = 1.25) than in the outgroup condition, (M = 1.11, SD = 
1.05). There was also a main effect of age where 6-year-olds used a more diverse range of 
mental state words (M = 1.48, SD = 1.20) than 5-year-olds (M = .98, SD = 1.06), F (1, 124) = 
9.07, p  SDUWLDOȘ , 95% CI [.17, .82], most probably because older children have 
a wider vocabulary (Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Interestingly, these main effects were qualified 
by a significant group membership × age interaction, F (1, 124) = 4.41, p  SDUWLDOȘ 
.03. Follow-up tests showed that 6-year-olds used a greater diversity of mental state terms in 
the ingroup condition (M = 1.72, SD = 1.25) than the outgroup condition (M = 1.23, SD = 
1.11), t (63) = 2.86, p = .006, d = .36, 95% CI [.15, .82] (see Figure 1, panel B), whereas 5-
year-olds did not (t (63) = .00, p > .250). As in the previous analysis, there was no main 
effect of type of group (F (1, 124) = .83, p > .250), no interaction between type of group with 
either age or group membership (all F¶VDOOp¶V!DQGQRVLJQLILFDQWWKUHH-way 
interaction (F (1, 124) = 1.33, p > .250). These findings suggest WKDWROGHUFKLOGUHQ¶s bias to 
generate a greater diversity of mental state terms in the ingroup condition held across both 
gender and geographically based groups. 
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In order to control for any possible influence of the total number of words spoken by 
children in the two conditions, we also reran these analyses with proportional scores. In these 
analyses, there was also a significant main effect of group membership, F (1, 124) = 4.06, p = 
SDUWLDOȘ  95% CI [.00, .02], and a significant interaction between group 
membership and age F (1, 124) = 6.71, p  SDUWLDOȘ $JDLQIROORZ-up tests 
showed that 6-year-olds produced a greater diversity of mental state words when describing 
ingroup interactions (M = .04, SD = .08) than when describing outgroup interactions (M = 
.02, SD = .02), t (63) = 2.49, p = .016, d = .31, 95% CI [.00, .04]. Five-\HDUROGV¶UHVSRQVHV
did not significantly differ between conditions (t (31) = - .75, p > .250). In this analysis, there 
was no significant main effect of age (F (1, 124) = 2.69, p = .103) or type of group (F (1, 
124) = .01, p > .250) and no other significant interactions (all F¶VDOOp¶V! 
Explicit Preference 
Finally, we conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA with FKLOGUHQ¶VJURXS membership 
(ingroup, outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) and type of 
group (gender, geographical location) as between-subjects factors on explicit preference 
ratings. This analysis confirmed that children liked members from their own group (M = 2.63, 
SD = .72) significantly more than members of the other group (M = 1.76, SD = 1.01), F (1, 
124) = 60.14, p SDUWLDOȘ 3, 95% CI [.65, 1.09]. There was no main effect of age 
RQFKLOGUHQ¶VH[SOLFLWSUHIHUHQFHF (1, 124) = .90, p > .250) and no interaction between 
group membership and age (F (1, 124) = .01, p > .250). There was no main effect of type of 
group (F (1, 124) = 1.93, p = .168) and this variable did not interact with group membership 
and/or age (all F¶VDOOp¶V! Hence, it seems that children felt similarly positive 
about both their own gender and geographically based group and their explicit preference did 
not vary by age. 
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Figure 1. The results for the mean number of mental state words (panel A) and for the mean 
diversity of mental states words (panel B) that 5- and 6-year-old children produced in each 
condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
Discussion 
Our results reveal that young children use mental state terms more often when 
describing members of their own social group. Furthermore, 6-year-old, but not 5-year-old, 
children use a greater diversity of mental state words when talking about their own group. 
This effect held across two different social categories ± based on gender and nationality. 
Importantly, these results cannot be explained by an increased motivation to talk more about 
the ingroup in general, as they held even when we reran the analyses with the proportion of 
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mental state words children produced for each video. Overall, our findings demonstrate that 
young children are selective in the way they attribute mental states to others.  
This study has important implications for our understanding of the origins of 
intergroup bias. Previous developmental research has tended to concentrate RQFKLOGUHQ¶V
relative preferences for members of their own groups (Dunham et al., 2011) and has 
established that children show both explicit and implicit (Baron & Banaji, 2006) preferences 
from early in development. Here, in contrast, we focus on mental state attribution. This topic 
is closely related to the concept of dehumanization (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Prior work with 
adults has found that individuals are less likely to attribute a mind to outgroup members 
(Hackel, Looser, & Van Bavel, 2014) which has significant consequences for moral 
judgements (Gray et al., 2007). Relevant research in philosophy and sociology has shown that 
dehumanization  is pervasive within the media and other social domains (Esses, Medianu, & 
Lawson, 2013; Redeker, 2007) and could thus have wide-ranging repercussions for group 
relations. Research into the development of dehumanizing biases may therefore enhance our 
understanding of intergroup harm and prejudice more generally. However, until now, this 
subject has received relatively little attention. Recent studies have suggested that children 
perceive less humanness in outgroup faces (McLoughlin et al., 2017) and rate the emotions of 
outgroup members to be less intense (Martin et al., 2008). Our results inform work in this 
related field by showing that, at least from the age of five, children are less likely to 
spontaneously reference the mental states of those belonging to another group.  
Our findings also have interesting implications for research on theory of mind.  Since 
:LPPHUDQG3HUQHU¶VVHPLQDOSDSHU, the study of mental state understanding has 
blossomed within developmental psychology. This work has primarily focused on when 
children first develop the ability to reason about the minds of others including their feelings 
(Hughes & Dunn, 1998) and beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). The current findings 
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underline the importance of considering the situations in which children are more or less 
motivated to deploy this skill, in addition to investigating when this ability emerges (Over, 
2016). 
A valuable question for future research is whether our results would extend beyond 
children in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic) cultures 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  Previous research has revealed that there are 
systematic differences in the emphasis that cultural groups place on mental states as 
explanations for other peRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXU(Lillard, 1998).  Cultural variations in both mental 
state attribution (Lillard, 1998) and intergroup dynamics (Fischer & Derham, 2016) could 
influence the relationship we observed in this study. 
The present study addresses a surprising disconnect between literature examining the 
development of intergroup cognition and theory of mind (Rakoczy, 2014). The combination 
of these research areas is of potential interest to academics working in more applied settings. 
For example, future work could explore the social consequences of biased mental state 
attribution and if encouraging children to attribute a mental life to outgroup members may 
increase their readiness to engage in prosocial behaviour (Drummond, Paul, Waugh, 
Hammond, & Brownell, 2014) in Western contexts and beyond.  In this way, investigation 
into the development of dehumanization may ultimately inform research-led interventions to 
foster more positive intergroup relations. 
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